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Abstract
Given opinions of members of a society on a set of policies, as ordinal preferences; an approach to polarization
is introduced. The concept here is considering polarization in a society as an aggregation of pairwise
antagonisms, which depend on identification within groups as well as alienation among groups. Among
measures which comply to this sort of conceptualization, a class of functions which satisfies certain plausible
properties is introduced for the case of three alternatives. This class coincides with the class characterized
for unidimensional spaces in Esteban and Ray (1994).
Highlights:
• We model how to measure polarization with ordinal preferences.
• Polarization is seen as the aggregation of pairwise antagonisms.
• We propose anonymous and neutral measures that satisfy certain plausible properties.
Keywords: polarization measures, ordinal preferences, alienation, identification
1. Introduction and the Model
Since polarization is understood to be closely related to social discord and induction of enmity, it is
of interest how to understand and conceptualize polarization within a society with ordinal preferences.
One approach, not specifically preference based, suggests that it should be considered as the aggregation
of pairwise antagonisms within society. In this paper, following Esteban and Ray [6], we suggest that
antagonism felt by an individual towards another depends on the alienation between the two and also on
the feeling of identification he/she enjoys by being in wherever he/she is. Alienation then can be thought of
as a function of the dissimilarity between the two stances. We further postulate that identification can be
seen as a function of the support of one’s opinion. In a formal way, this would mean to measure polarization
in a society with a function as follows. ∑
j
∑
i
a(I(mi), A(d(oi, oj)))
Here the function I(mi) represents how much i is identified with his/her position, as a function of mi,
the share of the population who thinks the same with i. The function A(d(oi, oj)) represents the alienation
as an increasing function of the distance of opinions of i and j. Finally, the function a(I,A) represents the
antagonism felt by i towards j, as a function of identification i enjoys by being wherever i is and alienation
between i and j. Summing up for all directed pairs is then a measure of polarization as discussed. We
construe the set of properties in Esteban and Ray [6] and show that a subclass of the functions above
satisfies those properties for ordinal preferences over three alternatives. To our knowledge, this is the first
attempt at this question.1
Let A be the set of alternatives with |A| = m. There are m! possible linear orders and the set of all
those is denoted L(A). Let P¯ = (P 1, P 2, ..., Pm!) be an arbitrary listing of the set L(A). A preference
profile for a society of N individuals is a member of L(A)N . Given P¯ and PN ∈ L(A)N while letting
N P¯i = |{j ∈ N : Pj = P i}| we have a representing preference distribution (pi, P¯ ) where pi = (pi1, pi2, ..., pim!)
is such that pii = N
P¯
i /N . Hence we have that
∑m!
i=1 pii = 1.
A polarization measure is a mapping P : L(A)N → R+. Denoting the set of all preference distributions
(pi, P¯ ) by D, we have an equivalent depiction of polarization measures; P : D → R+.
In the following analysis, we will be employing a particular metric on linearly ordered preferences,
namely Kemeny metric.2 Given any P, P ′ ∈ L(A), the Kemeny distance between P and P ′ is defined as
dκ(P, P
′) = |P\P ′| where P\P ′ is the symmetric difference. The graph for three alternatives is as follows.
Figure 1: Kemeny graph, three alternatives
Now we introduce a set of properties on preferential polarization measures following the axiomatization
in Esteban and Ray [6].3
Definition 1 (Property 1). Let pii > pij = pik be the only masses of a profile such that pij and pik are at
least as close to each other as they are to pii. A polarization measure is said to satisfy Property 1 if joining
the two smaller masses at a point at least as further as the average distance to pii increases polarization.
1Baldiga and Green [2] analyze social choice functions in terms of assent maximizing attributes. Alcalde-Unzu and Vorsatz
[1] provide ways to measure consensus where their analysis which pertains to a consequentialist approach is not compatible
with framework of this paper.
2This widely known and used metric is due to Kemeny [7] for which Bogart [3] and Kemeny and Snell [8], inter alia, provide
axiomatic characterizations. Can and Storcken [5] provides a refinement of previous characterizations. For a general treat of
weighted distances between preferences, see Can [4].
3In fact, Property i here may be matched with Axiom i in Esteban and Ray [6], although we keep in mind that there is no
unique translation of each axiom into the current setting.
2
Figure 2: Property 1
Figure 2 depicts the two situations Property 1 apply to for three alternatives. The two small masses on
the right can be joined in a middle way further away than the larger mass (as in the move 1 in the figure),
or they can be imbricated at one of the positions with small densities (as in the move 2 in the figure). These
types of moves do not decrease (and in case of the move 2, do not increase) the average distance, hence
alienation, but increase within group support.
Definition 2 (Property 2). A polarization measure satisfies Property 2 if moving a mass that is opposed
mildly towards only smaller masses increases polarization.
Figure 3: Property 2
Property 2 basically requires that polarization increases whenever an in between stance is moved towards
the side which has a smaller support. This idea is explained in Figure 3 for three alternatives. What is
carefully required is that the move should be towards only smaller poles and is not carried by a strongly
opposed (this strength depends on the whole profile) mass.
Definition 3 (Property 3). A polarization measure satisfies Property 3 if for any profile of preferences
with three consecutive masses, dissolution of the middle mass equally into two sides increases polarization.
3
Figure 4: Property 3
Property 3 is an exact counterpart of Axiom 3 in Esteban and Ray [6] and the intuition is clear. The
following homotheticity property requires that the size of the society does not matter. Let λPN denote a
profile where NλP¯i = λN
P¯
i for all i ≤ m!.
Definition 4 (Homotheticity). Let PN and P
′
N˜
be two profiles with possibly distinct sizes; N and N˜ . A
polarization measure P satisfies homotheticity if P(PN ) ≥ P(P ′N˜ ) implies P(λPN ) ≥ P(λP ′N˜ ) for all λ > 0.
Finally, bipolarity, as a regularity property, requires that full concentration at one order is the least
polarized case and that bipolar society where one half is at the exact opposite of the other is the most
polarized.
Definition 5 (Bipolarity). Suppose PN is such that piQ =
1
2 = pi−Q for some Q ∈ L(A) and that P ′N
is such that pi′Q′ = 1 for some Q
′ ∈ L(A). A polarization measure P is said to satisfy bipolarity if
P(PN ) ≥ P(P˙N ) ≥ P(P ′N ) for all N ∈ N and P˙N ∈ L(A)N .
2. Results
Proposition 2.1. The polarization measure defined as
P∗α(pi, P¯ ) =
m!∑
j=1
m!∑
i=1
pi1+αi pij(dK(P
i, P j))
satisfies properties 1-3 for any α ∈ (0, α∗) with α ' 1.6 and m = 3.
Note that this function reduces to Gini Index with Kemeny distance when α = 0 and the higher α is
the higher the sensitivity to identification. In what follows, let’s fix P¯ = ((abc) = P 1, (bac) = P 2, (acb) =
P 3, (bca) = P 4, (cab) = P 5, (cba) = P 6) and denote the initial profile by PN and the profile after a described
move by P ′N .
Proof. Property 1: Without loss of generality (wlog), three cases may apply.
(i) pi1 > pi4 = pi6, and move pi4 → P 6: We have P(P ′N )− P(PN ) = pi4(pi1+α1 − pi1+α4 ) + pi1+α4 (6pi1(2α − 1)).
(ii) pi1 > pi2 = pi4, and move pi2 → P 6: We have P(P ′N )−P(PN ) = pi4(pi1+α1 − pi1+α4 ) + pi1+α4 (4pi1(2α − 1)).
(iii) pi1 > pi4 = pi5, and move (iii.a) pi4 → P 5 or (iii.b) {pi4, pi5} → P 6: (iii.a) induces that P(P ′N )−P(PN ) =
4pi1pi
1+α
4 (2
α − 1) whereas (iii.b) induces P(P ′N )−P(PN ) = 2pi4pi1+α1 + 2pi1pi1+α4 (3 · 2α − 2). In all cases, we
have P(P ′N ) > P(PN ) if α > 0.
4
Property 2: Let pi4 move to P
6 to induce P ′N . We have P(P ′N ) − P(PN ) > pi4(pi1+α1 + pi1+α2 − pi1+α3 −
pi1+α5 − pi1+α6 ) + pi1+α4 (pi1 + pi2 − pi3 − pi5 − pi6) which is positive if the move is only towards smaller poles,
or formally both pi1 > pi6 and pi2 > pi5, for any support pi3 of opposition to P
4 smaller than ∗ where
∗ = min{pi1 + pi2 − pi5 − pi6, (pi1+α1 + pi1+α2 − pi1+α5 − pi1+α6 )
1
1+α } whenever α > 0.
Property 3: The question reduces to that of the Axiom 3 in Esteban and Ray [6], and the proof that α is
bounded above approximately by 1.6, which pertains to that maxz≥0[(1 + α)(z − zα2 − z1+α)− 12 ] < 0, can
be found in the last paragraph of the proof of the Theorem 1 in that paper, p. 837.
Furthermore, it is quick to observe that the measure P∗ is anonymous and neutral in the sense that
it treats individuals and preferences equally. A polarization measure P is said to be anonymous if for
any profile PN , for any permutation σ : N → N of individuals, we have that P(PN ) = P(PσN ), where
PσN = (Pσ(i))i∈N . Similarly, a polarization measure P is said to be neutral if for any profile PN , for
any permutation δ : A → A of alternatives, we have that P(PN ) = P(δPN ) where δPN = (δPi)i∈N with
aPib ⇐⇒ δ(a)δPiδ(b).
Proposition 2.2. The polarization measure P∗α is anonymous, neutral and homothetic for any α ≥ 0 and
m ∈ N.
Proof. Take any N ∈ N and let σ : N → N be an arbitrary permutation. Since NPi = NσPi , we have
pii = pi
′
i for all i ∈ Nm! where pi′i = NσPi /N , which demonstrates anonymity. For neutrality it suffices
to observe that dκ(P, P
′) = dκ(δP, δP ′) for any P, P ′ ∈ L(A), under any permutation δ : A → A.4 The
homotheticity follows the fact that the summation is taken over the supports as percentages.
Finally, if we take α as 1, which reflects a simple antagonism function where alienation is represented as
the distance and identification as just the relative societal support of one’s preference5, the measure satisfies
the bipolarity condition.
Proposition 2.3. The measure P∗1 satisfies bipolarity, for m = 3.
Proof. The measure is zero if we have full concentration at one order, and strictly positive in all other
cases. For any two mass profile, increasing distance in between increases polarization clearly. Once they are
at exact opposites, making them equal in density will increase the measure.
Lemma 2.1. The bipolar case is more polarized than any three mass profile under P∗1 .
Proof. Suppose first that the three masses are not equidistant to each other. Two cases are possible. (Case
i) One is further away from the two. Let, w.l.o.g., the support be {pi1, pi2, pi5}. If pi5 > pi2, moving pi1 to
P 2 increases the value if pi25pi1 + pi
2
1(pi5 − pi2) + 6pi1pi2pi5 > pi22pi1 which is true. If pi2 > pi5, moving pi1 to P 5
increases the value if pi22pi1 + pi
2
1(pi2 − pi5) + 3pi1pi2pi5 > pi25pi1 which is true. (Case ii) One is at unit distance
to both. Let, w.l.o.g., the support be {pi1, pi2, pi3} and that pi2 > pi3. Moving pi1 to P 3 increases the value if
pi22pi1 + pi
2
1(pi2 − pi3) + 4pi1pi2pi3 > pi23pi1 which is true.
Now suppose the three masses are equidistant to each other. Let, wlog, the support be {pi1, pi4, pi5} and we
move pi1 to P
5. For this to increase polarization it is enough to have pi4 to be the greatest of the three. If
4A characterization of Kemeny distance incorporating neutrality can be found in Bogart [3].
5Formally, T (I, a) = a · I where I(pii) = pii and a(d(P i, P j)) = dK(P i, P j).
5
they are all equal size 13 , we have P∗1 (PN ) = 3(13 )2(2 13 + 2 13 ) = 49 < 2( 12 )2(3 12 ) = 34 where the latter is of the
bipolar case.
The following lemma shows that from any five or six mass profile, we can reduce the domain to four
masses and increase polarization.
Lemma 2.2. For any six (five) support profile, there exists a move that reduces the support of the profile
to five (four) and increases the value of P ∗1 .
Proof. Let masses at each (or all but one) location be positive. Wlog, either (i) pi1 > pi4 + pi5 + pi6 or
(ii) pi5 > pi4 + pi2 + pi1 is true. Suppose the first is true and move the mass pi2 to P
4.6 The difference
P(P ′N ) − P(PN ) = pi2[pi21 + pi23 − (pi24 + pi25 + pi26)] + pi22[pi1 + pi3 − (pi4 + pi5 + pi6)] is clearly positive. This
is regardless of pi3 being non-zero or not (in other words, the support being five or six masses) hence the
lemma demonstrated.
Corollary 2.1. For any six support profile there exists a consecutive pair of moves that induces a four
support profile with higher value under P∗1 .7
The final lemma below concludes the proof of the proposition by showing that from any (out of three
possible) four mass profile we can reduce to a two mass profile with higher measure.
Lemma 2.3. The bipolar profile is more polarized than any PN with four masses under P∗1 .
Proof. Let Σ ⊆ L(A) be the orders that have nonzero support in PN . Wlog, we have three cases.
(a) Σ = {P 1, P 3, P 4, P 6}. We have three distinct cases; either (i) pi4 ≥ pi3 and pi1 ≥ pi6 , or (ii) pi4 < pi3
and pi1 < pi6 , or (iii) pi4 > pi3 and pi1 < pi6 (not distinctively pi4 < pi3 and pi1 > pi6 is also possible.). For
the first two cases, moving pi4 to P
6 and pi3 to P
1 increases polarization if (pi4 − pi3)(pi1 − pi6) ≥ 0, which
is true. For the third case, moving pi1 to P
4 and pi6 to P
3 increases polarization if (pi4 − pi3)(pi6 − pi1) ≥ 0,
which is true.
(b) Σ = {P 1, P 4, P 5, P 6}. Moving pi6 to P 1 induces P(P ′N )−P(PN ) > 3pi1pi6(pi1−pi6) > 0 if pi1 ≥ pi6. If
otherwise, moving pi4 to P
2 and pi5 to P
3 induces P(P ′N )−P(PN ) = (pi4+pi5)(pi26−pi25)+(pi24+pi25)(pi6−pi1) > 0
which leaves us with the exact situation as before and hence moving pi1 to P
6 increases polarization.
(c) Σ = {P 1, P 2, P 4, P 6}. Moving pi2 to P 3 induces P(P ′N )−P(PN ) = 2pi2pi4(pi2 +pi4) which is positive
and leaves us with the case (a).
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